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FREDERIK VAN DE PUTTE1
Abstract: We argue for a new approach to free choice permission in the
context of a-temporal STIT logic. According to our analysis, an agent has
a free choice permission w.r.t. two propositions ϕ and ψ iff (a) the agent is
permitted to see to ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and (b) the agent is permitted to see to ψ ∧ ¬ϕ.
The primitive notion of permission we use is the dual of one of Horty’s
operators for “ought to do” from (Horty, 2001). We argue that the approach
improves on existing proposals in various ways.
Keywords: Free choice permission, Deontic logic, STIT logic, Multi-
agency
1 Introduction
Jane goes to the fruit buffet and asks the waiter which pieces of fruit she can
take. The waiter replies: “you may take an apple or a pear”. We take this
statement to be equivalent to “Jane is free to choose between taking an apple
and a pear” or to “Jane has a free choice between taking an apple and tak-
ing a pear”. Let us represent such statements formally as Fj(apple, pear),
where apple, pear are states of affairs (that Jane takes an apple, resp. a pear)
and j is shorthand for Jane. In this case, we say that the agent (i.c. Jane) has a
free choice permission (henceforth FCP) w.r.t. the two options apple, pear.
Likewise, an agent may have a FCP w.r.t. three, four, or more options.
Our aim in this paper is to propose a new semantics for the operator Fj ,
one that arguably improves on existing accounts. We focus on the binary
case for the sake of simplicity; however, all our observations and our own
proposal generalize readily to a finite number n ≥ 2 of choices.
Mind that we take FCP here to concern a normative claim, i.e. it is not
simply a descriptive claim about what the agent can choose (as in “you can
1Research for this paper was funded by the Flemish Research Foundation (FWO-
Vlaanderen). The basic ideas for this paper were obtained during a research stay in Bayreuth
(July 2016), which was co-funded by the PIOTR project (RO 4548/4-1). Many thanks to Olivier
Roy, Igor Sedlar, and Nathan Wood for stimulating discussions, as well as more concrete sug-
gestions.
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choose to kill your wife or not, but there is no reason whatsoever to kill
her”), but it is a claim about what the agent is permitted to choose. In
the remainder, we moreover presuppose that we are working with a single
normative system that grounds claims concerning FCP.
Another very important point is that FCP, as we think of it, concerns a
given agent and a concrete deliberative context for that agent, i.e. a situation
in which that agent has to make a choice among a number of options that
are “real”. By the latter we mean that choosing one such option entails that
the option is effectively realized. So our problem is: given that the agent
has to make a choice, when can we say that the agent is permitted to choose
between ϕ and ψ?
Perhaps it makes sense to claim that one (everyone, someone, ...) is free
to order a pizza or spaghetti at piazza San Marco in Venice, but these are not
two options that present themselves to you at this very moment (unless of
course you happen to be reading this paper at San Marco). So in this sense
you do not have the FCP here and now to order a pizza or spaghetti at San
Marco. We explicitly leave such forms of “free choice permission” out of
the picture in this paper.2
To fully appreciate this point, consider the following example from Sedlár
(2016): suppose that according to the laws of your country, you are permit-
ted to travel abroad and you are permitted to vote. These two actions are
clearly distinct, meaning that you can do one without the other. Still, it
seems to make little sense to say that you have a free choice between travel-
ing abroad and voting. The two are simply not related, and hence we do not
think in terms of making a choice between either.
Suppose however that you are in a specific situation in which traveling
abroad is one of your options and voting is another. For instance, you may
have to decide here and now between going to a conference, thus missing
out on the elections, and staying home so that you can vote; there happens
to be no way you can combine both. Assume moreover that not voting is
permitted in your country, and likewise, that you are not obliged to go to
the conference either. There is no other feasible option that would be way
2One might argue that this claim really communicates that once you are at San Marco,
you have the free choice between pizza and spaghetti, and (perhaps) moreover that you are
permitted to go to San Marco in the first place. To model such claims, one could extend our
current analysis, e.g. by adding a possibility operator which ranges over alternative deliberative
contexts and (perhaps) also a similarly wide-ranging permission operator. But even if one
disagrees, it still makes sense to focus on the concrete here-and-now FCP as we do, before
trying to tackle other (probably more complicated) notions.
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better than each of these options. Then, on the approach we advocate here, it
does make sense to say you are free to choose between voting and traveling
abroad.
In other words, whether we can speak of a genuine choice between two
options is a matter of context. In our account, the options of agents are made
explicit within the models, whence we can explicate necessary and sufficient
conditions for a FCP. This means in turn that FCP does not only depend on
the norms that apply in the context, but also to the available choices of the
agent — we return to this point below.
2 Some general observations
To get our analysis off the ground, let us make a number of observations
about FCP and the way it relates to permission in natural language. Some
of these are not original, but we collect them here for ease of reference.3
(I) Fα(ϕ,ψ) does not entail that every way of making ϕ, resp. ψ true, is
permitted.4 In other words, Fα(ϕ,ψ) does not entail that either ϕ or
ψ is “sufficient for permissibility”.5
To understand this claim, suppose that whoever takes a pear or an apple
should also take a napkin (since the apples and the pears are very juicy).
Jane may well take a pear or an apple without taking a napkin. That mere
fact by no means entails that she is no longer free to choose between taking
an apple and taking a pear. In fact, “you are free to choose between an apple
and a pear, but do take a napkin in case you take either” sounds perfectly
consistent. It would be strange to say that in such cases, you are really only
free to choose between taking an apple and a napkin, or taking a pear and a
napkin.
3Although we call them “observations” and although they are clearly inspired by natural
language, these points should not be taken as purely descriptive facts of the matter. Rather,
they are salient properties of what we consider a useful and natural concept of free choice
permission, one that allows us to report on the permissibility of an agent’s choices in a given
situation.
4A similar remark is made by Giordani and Canavotto (2016, p. 89): “we are ordinarily
allowed to choose between alternative actions even if there are ways of performing such actions
that lead to a violation of the law”.
5See (Van De Putte, 2016) for a formal investigation of this notion of sufficiency.
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(II) A free choice permission w.r.t. ϕ and ψ – relative to a given body of
norms – entails that both choosing ϕ and choosing ψ are permitted
here and now, relative to the same body of norms.
“You are free to choose between taking an apple or a pear, but actually
all apples must remain untouched” sounds self-contradictory – at least, if
we interpret both parts of the sentence as expressing information about one
and the same normative system. When someone makes such a claim, we
will automatically infer that the speaker wants to distinguish between two
normative systems (e.g. the law regarding apples and pears on the one hand,
and the rules of the house regarding apples and pears on the other).
(III) That ϕ and ψ are permitted does not entail that there is a FCP.
There are at least two ways this can be argued against:
(iii.a) ϕ may entail ψ. It may be permitted to take a piece of fruit, and it
may also be permitted to take an apple, but it doesn’t make sense to
infer from this that you are free to choose between taking a piece of
fruit and taking an apple.
(iii.b) It may be obligatory that ϕ whenever ψ. For instance, it may be
obligatory that you take an apple whenever you take a pear. In that
case, even if both are permissible, one cannot infer that you are free
to choose between taking an apple and taking a pear.
One may argue that if ϕ and ψ are mutually exclusive (and i.c. when
ψ = ¬ϕ), then the permissibility of both entails that there is a FCP. Here,
our stance is more subtle: we will argue (in Sections 4 and 5) that this
depends essentially on the notion of permissibility one is using.
(IV) FCP is always relative to an (a group of) agent(s): it is always the
permission of an agent to choose between a number of things.
It makes no sense to say there is a free choice between X and Y , unless
one refers (implicitly) to one or more agents that are permitted to make this
choice. Also, FCPs of one agent α need not coincide with FCPs of another
agent β. Jack may be free to choose whether his back door is left open at
night, but his neighbour Daniel clearly does not have a FCP w.r.t. this same
state of affairs. This distinguishes FCP from the concept of permission that
is at stake in sentences like “it is permitted that your car is parked here”,
where it does not matter who brings it about that the car is parked.
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(V) Fα(ϕ,ψ) entails that α can in fact choose between ϕ and ψ, that both
are “live options” for α.
“You are free to choose between winning or losing the lottery, but there
is no way you can choose among either” seems to make little sense – again,
when it is taken to report a permission that applies here and now. In this
sense, FCP is a mixed notion, since it presupposes not only normative claims,
but also claims about the possible choices of agents.
3 Existing Accounts of FCP
In the deontic logic literature, FCP is usually considered problematic in
view of our Observation (II). That is, when FCP is formalized by P(ϕ ∨
ψ), one cannot accomodate this observation within Standard Deontic Logic
(SDL).6 Adding a corresponding axiom schema would trivialize the logic,
whence one is bound to look for alternative accounts of permission or dis-
junction in order to handle such inferences.
Mind however that permissions of disjunctions do not behave uniformly
in natural language. Often they do behave like FCPs; but often they don’t:
(a) If we negate a sentence of the form “it is permitted that ϕ or ψ”,
then that permission behaves like a disjunction of permissions after
all. That is, “it is not permitted that you take an apple or a pear”
usually means “it is not permitted that you take an apple and it is not
permitted that you take a pear”. This is not at all the same as saying
that “you are not free to choose between having an apple or a pear”
– perhaps someone else is to decide, or perhaps you can only take an
apple.7
(b) Embedded permissions over a disjunction are also sometimes inter-
preted as disjunctions of permissions. That is, “You may take an ap-
ple or a pear, but ask the waiter which of both” usually communicates
uncertainty about the norms at hand, rather than a FCP.
Note also that, even if SDL does not validate the inference from P(ϕ ∨
ψ) to Pϕ ∧ Pψ, it does validate other seemingly plausible principles. For
6SDL is just the normal modal logic KD, with  read as “it is obligatory that” and ♦ as
“it is permitted that”.
7Thanks to Malte Willer for drawing our attention to this problem (during a Q&A session
at the DEON2016 conference).
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instance, from “it is permitted to take an apple and a pear”, a competent
language speaker will infer that “it is permitted to take an apple”. Rejecting
all such inferences, simply in order to be able to validate the inference from
P(ϕ∨ψ) to Pϕ∧Pψ, can hardly be seen as a proper solution to the problem
of free choice permission.
This is not in itself an argument against reducing FCP to a combination
of some concept of permission and some concept of disjunction. It does
show that one cannot simply defend such an account by referring to the
behavior of permission in natural language. Quite to the contrary: having
various formal operators of permission around seems inevitable, if one is to
explain the various ways utterances such as “may”, “can”, “it is permitted
that” and the like behave and interact with “not”, “and”, and “or” in natural
language.
But there is more. Even when intended solely as a formal account of
FCP, the existing proposals are insufficient. To argue for this in full would
require that we go over every such proposal, spell out the relevant formali-
ties, and argue why it gives counterintuitive properties for F. For reasons of
space we cannot do this here; we will however point out in brief terms what
our main worries are.
First, one general weakness of existing accounts is that they do not make
it explicit which agent has a given FCP. Perhaps these approaches can be
enriched so that one obtains an agent-relative concept of FCP, which acco-
modates observations (IV) and (V); but this remains to be done. Mind that,
even if one abstracts from the agent in question – as this is often done in de-
ontic logic –, one should still be able to distinguish between states of affairs
that the agent can see to, and states of affairs that are beyond its abilities; at
least if one agrees with observation (V).
Second, it is shown in (Hansson, 2013) that any intensional account of
FCP in terms of unary permission and disjunction will give extremely coun-
terintuitive results, due to the validity of replacement of classical equivalents
(RE). By (RE), we can e.g. infer from the fact that it is permitted to either
take an apple or not, P(a ∨ ¬a), that it is also permitted to either take a
napkin or not, P(n ∨ ¬n). But the free choice interpretation of the former
statement clearly need not imply the free choice interpretation of the latter.
Hansson’s observation still leaves room for alternative accounts. One of
them is to translate FCP straight into a conjunction of permissions:
F(ϕ,ψ) =df Pϕ ∧ Pψ — let us call this the conjunctive account of FCP.
This is in line with Makinson (1984), who claims that the so-called para-
dox of FCP only arises due to a mistranslation of natural language into the
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deontic formalism.
However, in view of our Observation (III), this simple version of the
conjunctive account does not allow us to fully characterize FCP. In Section
4 we will consider more refined conjunctive accounts. There, it will become
clear that also these variants fall short of capturing FCP, when based on
the standard concepts of permission taken from the literature. In Section 5
we will however show that, when P is itself an agent-dependent notion of
permission, one variant of the conjunctive account does work.
Another alternative – which is suggested by Hansson himself – is to treat
FCP as a primitive, binary operator. We will not have much to say about
this approach here; it may well be promising as a “minimalistic” account of
FCP, omitting explicit operators for agency and ability.8 Still, as we show
in the remainder of this paper, for the specific notion of FCP in a delibera-
tive context it is possible to reduce FCP to a suitable combination of unary
permission and classical connectives. Such an account moreover has the ad-
vantage that it clearly links the various well-known notions of permission to
FCP, thereby providing an explanation of (some of) its behavior.
Finally, one may question the very idea that a logic for FCP should be
intensional and hence closed under (RE). That is, one may advocate a hyper-
intensional account of permission, following Anglberger, Faroldi, and Ko-
rbmacher (2016) and Fine (2016). For instance, Fine works with a distinct
set of “ideal” actions, where actions are to be understood as states (ordered
according to part-whole). Pϕ is then true iff every action that is in compli-
ance with ϕ is contained in some ideal action. Since the set of actions in
compliance with ϕ ∨ ψ equals the union of the set of actions in compliance
with ϕ and the set of actions in compliance with ψ, we immediately get
P(ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (Pϕ ∧ Pψ). This account also validates the intuitive principle
that P(ϕ ∧ ψ) ` Pϕ.
However, the problem remains here that P(ϕ ∨ ψ) and Pϕ ∧ Pψ are
equivalent, which runs counter to our Observation (III) if we take P(ϕ∨ψ)
as the definiens of F(ϕ,ψ).9 It is also not clear how “actions” are to be
individuated in this framework, when applied to the simple cases that we
8The only work in this direction that we are aware of is the unpublished manuscript (Sedlár,
2016). Here, Hansson’s suggestion is worked out into a full formal system with operators for
permission that have an arbitrary arity. One of the problems of this formal system is that it does
not account for our Observation (V). We decided to leave a full discussion of this for another
occasion.
9One may counter this objection by defining F(ϕ,ψ) as P((ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)), but in
the context of the hyperintensional logics from (Fine, 2016), negation seems too weak to fully
express mutual exclusiveness of the involved states of affairs.
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present in Section 4. Even if this does not amount to a wholesale rejection
of the hyperintensional account of FCP, it does show that some more work
needs to be done in order to obtain a full explication of FCP.
4 Permissions and Choice in STIT logic
In the remainder, we will focus on a very simple notion of a deliberative
context. It is our conviction that we should at least try to get our interpre-
tation of the language right for these simple models; once we are there, we
can start looking at more complex structures.
The models we obtain are simple versions of the BT+AC-frames known
from (Belnap, Perloff, Xu, & Bartha, 2001) and (Horty, 2001), stripped from
temporal aspects, and enriched with a deontic component. They can also be
seen as multi-agent, one-shot games. The deontic component consists in
specifying which outcomes of the game are permissible (normatively ok,
acceptable, legal) and which are not. Intuitively speaking, one may think of
those outcomes as satisfying all norms that apply in the context at hand.10
Language Let S = {p, q, . . .} be a set of sentential variables and Agt =
{α1, . . . , αn} be a set of n distinct agents. Our formal language is defined
by the following BNF, where p ∈ S and α ∈ Agt:
W := p | ¬〈W〉 | 〈W〉 ∨ 〈W〉 | ♦〈W〉 | P〈W〉 | Ps〈W〉 | [α]〈W〉
The connectives ∧,⊃,≡ are defined in the standard way. ♦ is an existen-
tial modality (read as “it is possible that”); P represents weak permission and
Ps represents “strong permission” (also known as “deontic sufficiency”).
[α]ϕ expresses that “α’s choice guarantees that ϕ is the case”.11
Frames and Models We assume a set W of possible worlds, and a non-
empty set P ⊆W of permissible worlds. W represents the modal base, i.e.
the set of all possible outcomes, regardless of what the agents choose. To
model choices, we moreover need for each agent α a partition Cα of W into
choice cellsX ⊆W . Frames are thus triples of the type 〈W,P, {Cα}α∈Agt〉.
10Accordingly, the operators for weak and strong permission defined below should be seen as
weak, resp. strong counterparts of “must” or “obligatory”, rather than of “ought”. See (McNa-
mara, 1996) for a discussion of these various modalities and their behavior in natural language.
11[α] is also referred to as the Chellas stit in the literature on STIT logic. See e.g. (Horty,
2001) for a discussion of this and other operators for agency in STIT.
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Where w ∈W and α ∈ Agt, we let Cα(w) denote the unique X ∈ Cα such
that w ∈ X , i.e. the choice that is actually taken by α at w.
We assume the condition of independence of agents: whenever X1 ∈
Cα1 and . . . and Xn ∈ Cαn and each of the αi (i ≤ n) are distinct, then
X1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xn 6= ∅. This condition ensures that no given agent αi can
prevent another agent αj from making any of its choices.
We say that a model is a quadruple M = 〈W,P, {Cα}α∈Agt, V 〉, where
〈W,P, {Cα}α∈Agt〉 is a frame and V : S → ℘(W ) is a valuation func-
tion. The semantic clauses for the modal operators are as follows (where
w∈W ):
(SC1) M,w |= ♦ϕ iff there is a w′ ∈W such that M,w′ |= ϕ
(SC2) M,w |= [α]ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for all w′ ∈ Cα(w)
(SC3) M,w |= Pϕ iff there is a w′ ∈ P such that M,w′ |= ϕ
(SC4) M,w |= Psϕ iff, for all w′ ∈W such that M,w′ |= ϕ, w′ ∈ P
That α is able to enforce ϕ can be expressed by ♦[α]ϕ – see (Horty,
2001, Section 2.3) for an elaborate discussion of this approach to the logic
of ability. We can express and abbreviate the claim that “α has a choice
between ϕ and ψ” as follows:
Cα(ϕ,ψ) =df ♦[α](ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ ♦[α](ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)
Defining FCP Given these operators, various ways to define F suggest
themselves, as shown in Table 1.
(a) Pϕ ∧ Pψ (f) Ps(Cα(ϕ,ψ))
(b) P(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ P(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) (g) Ps([α](ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ ([α](ψ ∧ ¬ϕ))
(c) Cα(ϕ,ψ) ∧ P(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ P(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) (h) Ps((ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ))
(d) P[α](ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ P[α](ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) (i) Ps(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(e) P(Cα(ϕ,ψ)) (j) Ps(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ Cα(ϕ,ψ)
Table 1: Some possible ways to model FCP
However, neither of these formalizations are adequate w.r.t. each of our
observations (I)-(V), as we argue in the remainder of this section.
Ad (a)-(d). Note first that the definitions in (a) to (d) are of increasing
strength. Here, we will show that even (d) does not suffice to speak of free
choice.
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Example 1 α and β both have two choices: either take an apple, or not
take it. There are two apples in the fruit basket, so they can in fact both take
one. It is permitted that one apple is taken; however, it is not permitted that
both apples are taken. (Perhaps some third party should still have the option
of taking an apple, upon arrival.) Note that P[α]appleα and P[α]¬appleα
are both true (here, appleα stands for “α gets an apple”). Indeed, in case β
does not take the apple and α does take the apple, we end up in a permitted
state. However, it seems incorrect to say that α has a free choice in this
scenario, normatively speaking. Indeed, the only choice α can make that
ensures that we end up in an acceptable world, is by not taking the apple.
One may even argue that in this case, if α really wants to take an apple, then
α should discuss this with β so that they can coordinate their choices.12
The example shows that weak permission, in combination with agency
and/or the notion of choice as we formalized them here, cannot adequately
account for our intuitions regarding FCP. In fact, they point to a more general
problem with any such reduction: that it is permitted for an agent α to see
to it that such-and-such is the case, cannot be reduced to what the agent
does or chooses in any of the permissible states. This observation mirrors
Horty’s observations from Horty (2001, Section 3.4.2); we will return to it
in the next section. Mind that this feature of FCP is strongly linked to our
observation (IV).
Ad (e). Likewise, one cannot just model FCP in terms of the weak permis-
sibility of choices. Obviously, this cannot be done in the present framework,
since Cα(ϕ,ψ) and P(Cα(ϕ,ψ)) are equivalent in it.13 But even in purely
informal terms, such an analysis does not seem to make sense.
To see why, suppose α is permitted to carry a loaded gun when walking
on the street. Suppose moreover that α runs into an innocent person β. Let
us assume that at this point, one of α’s options is to kill β (suppose, for the
sake of argument, that α is perfectly aware that he can do this, that it is just a
matter of taking the gun, aiming it, and pulling the trigger). Clearly, α does
not have a FCP to kill β or not; killing β is simply impermissible. However,
12Alternatively, one might feel that conditional on β’s not taking an apple, α does have a
FCP, or that in the worlds where β actually takes no apple, α has this FCP. We will not go
into this argument in detail, but briefly point out in Section 5.2 how such conditional or world-
relative FCPs can be modeled according to our approach.
13This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the abilities of α are the same at every
point in a model.
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that does not all of a sudden make it impermissible for α to carry a loaded
gun, and hence to have the choice to kill β or not.
Ad (f)-(j). Note that among these definitions, (g) is the weakest.14 We now
show that even (g) is not necessary in order to have a FCP. The example can
be seen as a precise illustration of our earlier observation that FCP does not
imply sufficiency for permissibility (cf. Observation (I)).
Example 2 α has a choice between four states: take nothing, take an
apple and a napkin, take an apple and no napkin, take a napkin and no
apple. We assume moreover that there is exactly one state corresponding
to each of these choices. The only states that are permissible are the ones
where α takes nothing, or where α takes an apple and a napkin. It seems
intuitive to claim in this example that α is free to choose between taking an
apple or not. Likewise, “you are free to choose between taking an apple and
a pear, but in case you take a pear, you have to take a napkin as well” seems
perfectly allright.
5 Free Choice Permission
5.1 Permitted to see to
The above examples and discussion suggest an alternative account of FCP
that is directly based on deontic STIT logic (Horty, 2001). In this paper
we present a simplified, a-temporal version of it. We first define a deontic
preference relation on arbitrary sets of states X,X ′ ⊆ W . That is, let X 
X ′ iff for all w ∈ X , w′ ∈ X ′, w is permissible or w′ is impermissible.15
Where α is given, we now define a more fine-grained preference relation
between between choices X,X ′ of α. To do so, we need to introduce the
auxiliary definition of all choices of a group of agents A ⊆ Agt. That is,
where A consists of exactly n distinct agents α1, . . . , αn, we let CA =df
{X1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xn | X1 ∈ Cα1 , . . . , Xn ∈ Cαn}. Note that, in view of the
independence of agents-condition, CA is a partition of W . As before, we let
CA(w) denote the (unique) member X of CA such that X ∈ A".
We define:
14To see why, note that in general, if ϕ is stronger than ψ, then Psψ implies Psϕ.
15If we use a more refined semantics, e.g. one where each world is assigned a value within
the interval [0, 1], then obviously also the preference relation  can be further refined. See
(Horty, 2001) for how this would work.
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X v X ′ iff for every Y ∈ CAgt−{α}, X ∩ Y  X ′ ∩ Y
In other words, optionX is at least as good as optionX ′ iff whatever the
other agents do, the world we end up with when X is chosen will always be
at least as good as the world we end up with when X ′ is chosen.
Let @ be the strict counterpart of v, defined in the usual way. One may
now define a set of permissible choices of α as follows:
X ∈ Cα is permissible iff there is no X ′ ∈ Cα such that X ′ @ X
Note that if Cα is finite, then there will be always at least one permissi-
ble X ∈ Cα (relative to a given frame). In general there might be infinite
descending chains of “ever better actions”. In such cases one can refine the
definition of permissible choices as follows: X is permissible iff there is no
other choiceX ′ that is itself@-minimal within Cα, and for whichX @ X ′.16
We now introduce a new operator Pα for “α is permitted to see to it
that”, with the following semantic clause:
(SC5) M,w |= Pαϕ iff there is a permissible choice X of α such that
X ⊆ |ϕ|M .
Thus, Pαϕ means that there is a choice X of α which implies that ϕ is
guaranteed, and there is no choice Y of α that is strictly better than X .
5.2 Relation to Horty’s Analysis of Ought to Do
Using Horty’s ought-operator Oα for “dominance act utilitarianism” (Chap-
ter 4 of (Horty, 2001)), one can define our Pα as ¬Oα¬[α]. That is, Pαϕ is
true iff there is some “minimal” (in our terms, strongly permissible) choice
that guarantees ϕ, iff it is not the case that every optimal choice of α is such
that it is not the case that α sees to it that ϕ.
Following Horty, one may also define variants of these operators. We
will not go into detail here but just explain the main idea for two of them.
First, one can consider conditional variants. In our Example 1, a conditional
operator allows one to express such things as “given that α does not take an
apple, β is permitted to take an apple.” This can be done by defining the
preference relation over β’s choices in terms of their intersection with the
16See e.g. (Van De Putte & Straßer, 2014) for an elaborate discussion of such constructions
that deal with non-smooth preference relations.
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truth set of the antecedent of the conditional, i.c. that α does not take an
apple. See (Horty, 2001, Chapter 5, Section 1) for the formal details.
Second, one can define operators for permission based on Horty’s analy-
sis of “orthodox act utilitariansm” (Horty, 2001, Chapter 5, Section 4). The
main difference here is that what the agent is permitted to do depends on the
specific point of evaluation w ∈W . That is, we compare two actions X,X ′
of α by looking at the intersection of both with the set CAgt−{α}(w). So for
instance, looking again at Example 1, in the worlds where β takes no apple,
α is permitted to take an apple.
5.3 Free Choice Permission
So far we have only considered a unary operator that allows us to express
what an agent α is permitted to do. Once there, we apply a by now familiar
trick in order to express (binary) free choice permission:
Fα(ϕ,ψ) =df Pα(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ Pα(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)
In words, you have the free choice between ϕ and ψ (in a particular deliber-
ative situation) if and only if you are permitted to see to it that ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and
you are permitted to see to it that ψ ∧ ¬ϕ.
This implies that you are able to guarantee each of these states of affairs,
and hence also that they are distinct. It does however not imply that ϕ and
ψ are disjoint, or that their conjunction is not permitted.
It can be easily checked that this definition accomodates each of our
observations (I)-(V):
Ad (I) Immediate in view of the existential quantification in the semantic
clause for Pα. There may well be another impermissible choice X of α
which also guarantees either ϕ or ψ.
Ad (II) Suppose that Fα(ϕ,ψ) holds in a model; we prove that Pϕ. By the
definition of Fα, Pα(ϕ∧¬ψ). Hence by the semantic clause for Pα, there is
a permissible actionX of α such thatX ⊆ ‖ϕ‖M . We know thatX∩P 6= ∅
– otherwise X would not be permissible17 – and hence ‖ϕ‖M ∩P 6= ∅. But
this means exactly that Pϕ holds in the model.
Ad (III) In the model that corresponds to Example 1, P(appleα) andP(¬appleα)
are both true, but Fα(appleα,¬appleα) fails, since Pα(appleα) fails.
17For this step, it is crucial that P 6= ∅.
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Ad (IV) Immediate in view of the way Fα is defined. Note that we can easily
accomodate cases where Fα(ϕ,ψ) holds, but Fβ(ϕ,ψ) fails.18
Ad (V) Immediate in view of the definition of Fα(ϕ,ψ) and the semantic
clauses of Pα, ♦, and [α].
So although F implies weak permission, the latter does not allow us to
define F, in line with our examples from Section 4. Interestingly, we have
the following relation between FCP and strong permission:
Ps(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ),Ps(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ),Cα(ϕ,ψ) ` Fα(ϕ,ψ) (1)
The converse implication fails, as it should in view of our earlier dis-
cussion. So although FCP does not reduce to sufficiency for permissibility,
the former can still be derived from the latter whenever the agent has the
corresponding abilities.
6 Conclusion and outlook
In the preceding, we argued for a new approach to free choice permission,
in which the agents and their choices are represented explicitly within the
models and formal language. We showed that this approach matches each
of our basic observations concerning FCP, in contrast to existing formal ac-
counts.
A lot of open issues remain; we mention just three here. First and fore-
most, it remains to be seen if and how the resulting logic (including the
operators for weak and strong permission, P and Ps) can be axiomatized.19
Second, we mentioned some variants of Horty’s deontic STIT logic, whose
application to FCP is in need of further consideration. Third and last, we
deliberately restricted the focus to a very specific and simple notion of FCP
in this paper; one next step is to ask whether we can also get a grip on more
“loose” or complex types of free choice permission which do not refer to
one specific deliberative context.
18In fact, whenever α 6= β, Fα(ϕ,ψ) ⊃ ¬Fβ(ϕ,ψ) is a theorem of our logic. This follows
from the fact that Pαϕ entails ♦[α]ϕ and the independence of agents-condition, cf. Section 4.
19As we noted above, the fragment of our logic without P and Ps coincides with the a-
temporal fragment of (one of) the logic(s) of ought to do in (Horty, 2001). An axiomatization
for these logics can be found in (Murakami, 2005).
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